Judges and Products Law: Provisional Truths and Designated Designers by Shapo, Marshall S.
DePaul Law Review 
Volume 49 
Issue 2 Winter 1999: Symposium - Judges as 
Tort Lawmakers 
Article 10 
Judges and Products Law: Provisional Truths and Designated 
Designers 
Marshall S. Shapo 
Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review 
Recommended Citation 
Marshall S. Shapo, Judges and Products Law: Provisional Truths and Designated Designers, 49 DePaul L. 
Rev. 405 (1999) 
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review/vol49/iss2/10 
This Commentaries is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in DePaul Law Review by an authorized editor of Via Sapientiae. For more information, 
please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu. 
JUDGES AND PRODUCTS LAW: PROVISIONAL
TRUTHS AND DESIGNATED DESIGNERS
Marshall S. Shapo
INTRODUCTION
Are judges still making products liability law? Should they be? As
Steve Landsman said, the answers are both self-evident and compli-
cated. The complexity of the answer is evident in the fact that I agree
with everyone on something and I disagree with everyone on some-
thing. Partly it depends on what you mean by lawmaking and, as
Mike Green explained by colorful reference to riverboat piloting,1
what you mean by law.
I find an implicit message in Ted Eisenberg's article 2-although I
understand that he does not announce this conclusion-that we have
developed a mature jurisprudence. I tend to subscribe to that idea,
although I observe that it would be interesting to see data on the pe-
riod beginning in 1963, when the judicial revolution in products liabil-
ity began in earnest with Greenman v. Yuba Power Products., Inc.,3
and Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp.4
I found very interesting the ideas of Lucinda Finley, whose work
intersects with the idea of market experimentation that I advanced in
1979 in A Nation of Guinea Pigs.5 An important issue she identifies is
whether, in cases of uncertainty, courts will tilt toward putting the bur-
den on the consumer or the seller.6 This is a particularly interesting
presentation of the question of how regulatory tort law should be.
Mike Green's quotation from Joseph Sanders on a "congregation of
Bendectin cases" was quite apt.7 The thrust of the quotation is in line
1. Michael D. Green, The Road Less Well Traveled (And Seen): Contemporary Law Making in
Products Liability, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 377, 377 (1999).
2. Theodore Eisenberg, Judicial Decisionmaking in Federal Products Liability Cases, 1978-
1997, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 323 (1999).
3. 377 P.2d 897, 900-02 (Cal. 1963).
4. 191 N.E.2d 81, 82-83 (N.Y. 1963).
5. MARSHALL S. SHAPo, A NATION OF GUINEA PIGS (1979).
6. Lucinda M. Finley, Guarding the Gate to the Courthouse: How Trial Judges Are Using Their
Evidentiary Screening Role to Remake Tort Causation Rules, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 335, 366-67
(1999).
7. See Green, supra note 1, at 396.
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with my portrayal of a cross-country conversation among courts about
products liability law.
I do not disagree with Ted leaving out the asbestos cases, 8 but I
point out their importance in the general scheme of things. As I will
elaborate in a moment, asbestos cases are not, doctrinally, a world
unto themselves, but rather have provided a shot of legal hormone
into general products liability jurisprudence.
I. LAW AND CULTURE
These staccato remarks provide a partial foundation for my re-
sponse to the question, are judges still making products liability law?
The general answer is that indeed they are. Products law is at once a
battleground and a cultural mirror, and it is a cultural mirror because
it is a battleground. It is reflective of the tensions in society, and cor-
responding tensions in the minds of judges; it reflects, to a certain ex-
tent, mood swings in society.
Working against this background, and by the force of their roles as
resolvers of disputes, judges are the designated designers of law.
"Making law" in this sense is an ongoing transcription of changes in
society's mind. Products decisions represent readings of the effects of
technology and of marketing, and they reflect increasing judicial so-
phistication about science-both its contributions and its limits as a
tool in legal decisionmaking.
II. A GARDEN OF LEGAL VERSES
Some recent developments represent a holding of the line, and
sometimes a drawing in of the boundaries. But the line is a jagged
one. Let us look at some specifics.
Scientific proof
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,9 and its progeny,
Joiner v. General Electric Co.,1° and now Kumho v. Carmichael Tire
Co.,11 confirm Mike's reference to defective prophecy. (I would note,
though, that this is a minor error in prediction, as legal analysis goes,
as compared with such egregious mistakes as that of the Supreme
Court in Jones v. Clinton.1 2) One question on the table now is
8. See Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 325.
9. 508 U.S. 579 (1993).
10. 78 F.3d 524 (11th Cir. 1996).
11. 119 S. Ct. 1167 (1999).
12. 520 U.s. 681 (1997).
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whether interpretations of Federal Rule of Evidence 703 emphasizing
such factors as peer review will ultimately be recognized as significant
mistakes.13
Are judges making law in the proof area? As explicated by Mike
and Lucinda, courts surely are refining a group of legal principles. Lu-
cinda's remarks dramatically demonstrate the overlap of substance
and procedure. We will have many more chapters in this saga, with
many more twists and turns in the attempt to define what truth is for
purposes of the law.
Economic loss
A notable demonstration of judicial lawmaking in this quintessen-
tially common law area appears in the Supreme Court's decisions on
the economic loss issue in products liability. One member of this in-
teresting pair of cases is the East River Steamship Corp., v. Transamer-
ica Delaval, Inc.,14 applying the economic loss rule to deny recovery in
admiralty. The other is J.M. Martinac & Co. v. Saratoga Fishing,15
which establishes a liability rider for other property. East River is par-
ticularly interesting because, although it has no precedential force in
state courts, it has been cited frequently in state decisions.
Asbestos
As I have indicated, asbestos litigation presents a particularly pow-
erful demonstration of judicial lawmaking in the products area. As-
bestos, if a set of crystallographic worlds unto itself, is not just a law
unto itself. It has provided extra substance in the law of products lia-
bility, occasionally to the point of being transformative.
The strands of fibrous warp and woof that run throughout products
law begin with Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products,16 with its insis-
tence that "the product could still be unreasonably dangerous ... if
unaccompanied by adequate warnings."'1 7 They include the few deci-
sions that have viewed asbestos as unreasonably dangerous per se.
In warnings law, some decisions have contributed to a theoretical
basis for a true strict liability for failure to warn. Borel was an initia-
tor of this process, although the court cited abundant evidence of the
recognized dangers of asbestos. 18 Much-battered Beshada v. Johns-
13. See, e.g., Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94.
14. 474 U.S. 814 (1985).
15. 520 U.S. 1263 (1997).
16. 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973).
17. Id. at 1089.
18. Id. at 1092-94.
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Manville Products, Corp.19 represents the fullest flowering of this idea
in case law. Asbestos also features the interplay, perhaps insuffi-
ciently explored, between warnings and defect law.
We should not forget the plain vanilla negligence law that has
emerged from the asbestos cases. The most graphic examples appear
in the decisions dealing with that marvelous example of the value of
discovery, the Sumner Simpson papers.20 Asbestos gives us volumes
of law on proof, for example, concerning the question of whether a
particular firm's product was involved in the development of an
illness.
Discovery
A little encyclopedia of case law has featured fact-specific questions
arising under the discovery rule for purposes of statutes of limitations.
Asbestos has been a recurrent actor on this stage. One of the most
provocative opinions features Judge Weinstein's recognition in a DES
case that plaintiffs may only discover claims "in pieces," and that so-
phistication and gender may be elements of the discovery puzzle.21
Lucinda has given us important background for our understanding of
these matters. 22
Preemption
One area where casual observers might not ordinarily think of
judges making products liability law is in the field of intergovernmen-
tal relations, but that is exactly what is happening in preemption,
across more than half an alphabet of states. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr23
is the most recent prime example. It is the parent of a large family of
decisions on devices, but there are also streams of cases on auto re-
straints and pesticides.24 These decisions feature important argu-
ments, under the magnifying glass of products law, about how we
govern ourselves.
19. 447 A.2d 539 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1982).
20. Sumner Simpson was President of Raybestos-Manhattan Corporation, and the Sumner
Simpson papers consist of correspondence between Simpson and the general counsel for Johns-
Manville regarding the dangers of asbestos. See Threadgill v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 928
F.2d 1366, 1369 (3d Cir. 1991); King v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 906 F.2d 1022, 1025 (5th
Cir. 1990).
21. See Braune v. Abbott Labs., 895 F. Supp. 530, 545 (E.D.N.Y. 1995).
22. See Finley, supra note 6.
23. 518 U.S. 470 (1996).
24. See generally, 1 MARSHALL S. SHAPO, THE LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY 11.03[6][a-t]
(3d. 1994 & Supp. 1999).
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III. DEFECT
Restatement and Reaction
A continuing enterprise in judicial lawmaking features exegesis on
the test for defect. The Connecticut court's decision in Potter v. Chi-
cago Pneumatic Tool Co.25 provided an immediate challenge to the
Products Restatement's strong expression of preference for a risk-util-
ity test in design cases.26 It also advanced a counterpoint to the Re-
statement's general requirement that claimants show a reasonable
alternative design.27
Warranty
With respect to basic private law theory, an interesting progression
appeared in the Restatement drafts concerning the use of warranty as a
products theory. The early drafts exhibited hostility to warranty as a
poacher on tort turf.28 The New York Court of Appeals confronted
this position frontally in Denny v. Ford Motor Co.,29 answering a certi-
fied question to the effect that a jury could rationally find a breach of
implied warranty of merchantability while also concluding that a vehi-
cle that rolled over was not defective. Perhaps judicial lawmaking
proved influential on Restatement synthesis here. The final Restate-
ment softened its position and hedgingly recognized that defect claims
may be brought under the implied warranty of merchantability. 30
Whether these judicial performances are, strictly speaking, making
law, or confirming law-a subject on which Terry Kiely and Steve
Sugarman have commented-may be a matter of dispute. Perhaps
under Mike Green's definition,31 they are not, strictly speaking, mak-
ing law. But clearly judges are not being potted plants.
Varied State Approaches
At the bedrock of theory, courts certainly are making law, some-
times different kinds of law. I have previously set out a catalog of the
many paths to products liability theory that state courts have trav-
eled-sometimes with differences only in the language, but sometimes
also in concept. Examine the products jurisprudence of Alabama,
25. 694 A.2d 1319 (Conn. 1997).
26. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. d (1998).
27. Potter, 694 A.2d at 1133-34.
28. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCT LIABILITY (Tentative Draft No. 1, § 2 cmt. n,
proposed final draft, § 2 cmt. n).
29. 662 N.E.2d 730 (N.Y. 1995).
30. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUC'rs LIABILITY § 2 cmt. n (1998).
31. See Green, supra note 1, at 378-79.
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California, Illinois, Massachusetts, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey,
New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Washington.32 From
coast to coast, from A to W, courts create law.
Cigarettes
The case of cigarettes is a splendid example of where private law
verges into the public law domain. We have witnessed an extraordi-
nary, multi-faceted effort to bring cigarettes into a legislative frame-
work. All of this has taken place in the shadow of products liability
law-which, as Bob Rabin has observed, did not prove much of a
boon to smoker plaintiffs for a generation.33
Bob has noted the remarkable recent surge in cigarette suits by
both private and governmental plaintiffs. I simply record a symbolic
event, a dramatic moment in the ALI's prolonged debate on the Re-
statement. Literally at the last minute, a member moved from the
floor to eliminate cigarettes from the list of categorically immunized
products, and the full Institute adopted the motion. Among other
symbolisms, this extraordinary occurrence highlighted the political
content of products liability law, not to mention of the Restatement.
We have come a long way from the billboards and radio ads I re-
member from my youth-"travels the smoke on the way to your
throat"-and even from comment i's reference to "good tobacco. '34
The issue will have to be fought out across the country, but there is at
least some ground to believe that cigarettes-long effectively viewed
as virtually a nondefective product per se-might be considered un-
reasonably dangerous in their very fiber.
IV. JUDICIAL LAWMAKING AS A FACT
Some may indulge in primal scream at judicial lawmaking in prod-
ucts liability law. Others may glory in it. All must reckon with it as a
fact: a striking illustration of a peculiarly American jurisprudence, cre-
ative, decentralized, and thereby often messy. Certainly it is never
stagnant.
Do judges make products liability law? With the massive body of
case law to which they now must refer, not to mention the uncon-
trolled growth of relevant academic theory, they may not, strictly
speaking, invent it very often, but they surely do develop it.
32. See Marshall S. Shapo, In Search of the Law of Product Liability: The ALI Restatement
Project, 48 VAND. L. REV. 631, 647-49 (1995).
33. See Robert L. Rabin, Enabling Torts, 49 DEPAUL L. REV 435, 448 (1999).
34. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. i (1998).
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As an aside, I point out that whatever law, or legal ideas that
judges-or even law professors-create, is all done in the shadow of
awesome predecessors:
0 Traynor, professor, author of the separate opinion in Escola v.
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 35 and, two decades later, the author of
Greenman.36
* Prosser, the synthesizer of the Assault Upon the Citadel,37 and
the principal drafter of Section 402A. 38
* Ehrenzweig, who in a remarkable 1951 essay defined a "negli-
gence liability without fault" for "initially dangerous activities
which, while legalized because of their social value, are held to strict
liability in terms of the negligence rule" for injuries "typical for the
particular enterprise" that reasonably could have been foreseen
when starting an activity. 39
* Robert Keeton, who it is our good fortune to have as a judicial
colleague in this very enterprise, and who as a professor fashioned a
concept of conditional fault that tied the embryonic development of
products liability law to Rylands v. Fletcher40 and Vincent v. Lake
Erie Transportation Co.41
So all of us, judges and professors, labor in a vineyard that has been
seeded for decades-for more than a century, as we reach back, with
Andrew Kaufman's magisterial work,42 to the antecedents of Mac-
pherson v. Buick Motor Co.43
Do judges still make products liability law? They can hardly avoid
it. Ted Eisenberg's statistics may imply a slowing down in the rate of
lawmaking and even a pushing back of frontiers.44 But this, too, in-
volves lawmaking.
Should judges make products law? Here an answer that combines
the normative and the descriptive: no matter how reluctantly they do
so, they are compelled to make law by force of circumstance.
35. 150 P.2d 436, 440 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).
36. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).
37. William L. Prosser, Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE
L.J. 1099 (1960).
38. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 402A (1965).
39. ALBERT A. EHRENZWEIG, NEGLIGENCE WITHOUT FAULT (1951).
40. L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868).
41. Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. Co., 124 N.W. 221 (1910).
42. ANDREW KAUFMAN, CARDOZO (1998).
43. 111 N.E. 1058 (1916).
44. See Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 323-31.
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V. CONCLUSION
I close with a cautionary note, instancing our society's views of
witchcraft through the centuries. In pre-Revolutionary times, people
believed in witches' curses as a fact. The sophisticated Americans of
the nineteenth century saw this as nonsense, full well understanding
that there were no witches. In the yet more enlightened last century
of this millennium, we now recognize that a self-professed witch who
utters a curse, knowing of the cursed person's emotional susceptibility,
might be held for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The
Problem of the Witch cautions us that all our truths are provisional,
our certainties subject to the swings of social attitudes.
